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An economic history of the development of California dairy policies from 1935 to 1965
is used to support the hypothesis that the incompatibility of discrete policy changes for a
dynamic industry generates deadweight losses.  Combining quantitative industry data with legal
and personal narratives provides evidence in support of the hypothesis.1
Introduction
California is the number one milk producing state with 17 percent of total U. S.
production.  Unlike other states, California operates outside of the Federal Milk Marketing
Orders; however, California has its own policies regulating milk marketing in the state.  The two
systems are similar in that both pool producer revenues.  Where the federal system pays all
producers the same blend price, California pays producers different blend prices depending on
the amount of quota a producer owns.  The quota does not limit production or direct marketing;
the quota is simply a tool for distributing revenues.  Sumner and Wolf (1996) show that the blend
price under the quota policy encourages less output as compared to the blend price under a
federal-style policy.
This paper presents an economic history of the creation of the California dairy quota
program.  The history begins with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.  Through
injunctions, in at least three examples in California, federal court judges deemed the provisions
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 in violation with the Commerce Clause of the U. S.
Constitution
1.
By these cases (and cases for other commodities and in other states), dairy producers in
California could see the Agricultural Adjustment Act crumbling.  So, in June 1934, the
California Farm Bureau Federation, milk producer associations, and others pushed for state
legislation. On June 1, 1935, Governor Frank Merriam signed into immediate effect the Young
Act, named for State Senator Sanborn Young of Los Gatos. (Kuhrt, 1965)
The Young Act of 1935 codified the dairy title from the Agricultural Adjustment Act for
California.  By placing the power to regulate market milk in the hands of the California Director
of Agriculture, the Young Act did not violate the U. S. Constitution.2
The Young Act of 1935
The Young Act granted eligible producer groups the opportunity to develop marketing
plans that set minimum prices in each marketing area.  The act stipulated that producer groups
write stabilization and marketing plans; however, before implementation, the plans had to be
approved by the California Director of Agriculture and the local control board. (California
Agricultural Code)
A marketing plan defined a marketing area, minimum prices, and fair trade practice
requirements.  Any distributor receiving more than a 100 gallons of fluid milk from a producer
(or association of producers) was required to have a contract to specify 1) an amount of milk to
be purchased; 2) prices and quantities of Class 1 and 2 milk; 3) date and method of payment; and
4) transportation charges.  The writers of the contract filed a copy of the signed contract with the
Director of Agriculture. (Tinley)
The Young Act also required the California Director of Agriculture to establish or
provide a method for determining minimum prices.  The minimum prices were to maintain an
"economic relationship" between the fluid and manufacturing milk prices. The minimum price
was to reflect the additional costs of producing and marketing fluid milk relative to
manufacturing milk. (California Agricultural Code)
Economists at the University of California did most of the work creating the minimum
price formulae.  The basis of the pricing formulae was the differential between fluid and
manufacturing milk prices during 1925 to 1929.  The differential also reflected the higher cost of
transportation, the maintenance of a uniform supply of milk year round, the cream price in the
adjacent marketing area, feed and labor costs, and any additional items discussed in the hearing3
to set the minimum price. (Tinley)  Although there was a formula and a hearing process to set the
minimum price, the Director did have limited power to adjust the price.
Milk Markets Evolve
Like federal attempts to “stabilize” agricultural markets, the Young Act was an
emergency response to the marketing conditions of the 1930s.  Of course, the markets for market
and manufacturing milk changed significantly over the 32 years of the Young Act.
Understanding these and other market changes is required for understanding the development
and eventual fall of the Young Act.
During World War II, subsidies affected milk markets, but the impact was temporary.
The period of greatest interest and major market changes began in the 1950s.  After the War,
“prices of other products, including input factors such as feed, labor, and equipment, which are
costs to dairymen, as well as the prices of Class I milk, increased at a more rapid rate [than the
manufacturing milk price].” (Clarke, et al. p7)
The Chief of the Marketing Division of the California Department of Agriculture William
J. Kuhrt reported to the California Assembly Interim Committee on Livestock and Dairies some
problems observed in the fluid milk market.  Before addressing the issues related to the market
milk industry, he began by looking at the manufacturing milk industry.  He noted that
manufacturing milk had fallen to less than 35 percent of total milk production.  He also observed
that close to 1300 Grade B (manufacturing milk) producers (about 10 percent of Grade B
producers) had left the industry over the period 1955 to 1956.  Kuhrt argued that given the facts
using manufacturing milk price as the basis of market milk might not be sensible anymore.
(Kuhrt, 1956)4
In the midst of the changing markets, the Acting Director of Agriculture W. C. Jacobsen
stated that the minimum market prices are to be adjusted up or down as economic conditions
dictated.  He elaborated, "Lower feed costs, lower manufacturing milk prices, and excess
supplies are important factors which may require a downward adjustment in prices."
  (Jacobsen,
p. 4)
The problems in the manufacturing milk market led to changes in the Young Act. An
amendment, effective September 1955, allowed the Director to adjust the price for market milk
by taking into consideration the differential between the manufacturing milk price and cost of
production.  The amendment called for a more comprehensive cost of production survey for both
market and manufacturing milk. (Kuhrt, 1965)  With the cost of production surveys and
manufacturing milk price, the Director could adjust the minimum price for market milk as he
saw fit.
More specifically, the amendment gave the Director of Agriculture the freedom to choose
which factors would be used to determine the minimum market milk price.  Kuhrt stated, "It
must be obvious that especially under present conditions, the Director, and our Bureau of Milk
Control, must have considerable freedom to exercise discretion in evaluating the importance of
each of the standards of the law so that a proper fluid milk price can be established." (Kuhrt,
1956, p. 4-5)  Although not clearly announced, Kuhrt's stance suggests that the Director was to
intervene in the market and ensure a "proper" price.  This stance is different from the original
Young Act and the stance of Acting Director Jacobsen.  Data presented in a following section
provide evidence to support the claim that the state raised the minimum market milk price above
what economics conditions would allow.5
Table 1 shows that the state average market milk price was greater than the
manufacturing milk price for several years from 1950 to 1967.  Notice that from 1955 to 1960
the difference between market and manufacturing milk increased.  The increase in the difference
or price premium came mostly from the increase in market price.  In the latter years, the price
premium fell.
Changes in the cost of production for regions producing both market and manufacturing
milk point to significant changes in milk production.  Throughout this period, the three of the
four major market and manufacturing milk regions showed an inversion of the normal pattern of
the cost of production for market and manufacturing milk (see table 2).  Although the difference
between the market and manufacturing milk prices declined, the market milk price still earned a
regulated premium although market milk cost less to produce than manufacturing milk.
A comparison of the state average prices with the cost of production for the various
regions suggests a "cost-price squeeze" in the manufacturing milk market.  After 1960, the
market milk cost of production declined, while the manufacturing milk cost of production
increased, but the premium for market milk over manufacturing milk remained significant.  Even
when the premium was at its lowest, market milk producers maintained high net gains.
For the four regions with significant manufacturing milk production, the average
difference in the cost of production for market and manufacturing milk from 1955 to 1968 (the
beginning of the data series to the end of the Young Act) was $0.14/cwt. for North San Joaquin,
$0.32/cwt. for South San Joaquin, $0.44/cwt. for North Bay, and $0.79/cwt. for Del Norte-
Humboldt. The state average milk price difference was $1.28.  Thus, the state average premium
for market milk tended to be much greater than the extra cost of producing market milk in any
region.  Clearly, without barriers, producers would enter the market milk industry, and the6
additional supply would lower the price.  In this case, the price premium relative to the cost of
production did not disappear because of the minimum price law.
Observed Problems in Marketing
According to Joe Gonsalves (1998), who had been a dairy farmer in the Los Angeles
basin in the 1950s and 1960s, the law allowed distributors to set the quantity of milk to purchase
from producers.  The law allowed a 30-day notice for cancellation of contracts by either party,
making producers vulnerable to contract cancellations.
Contractual problems were common throughout the State.  In another interview, one
dairyman from Kings County (1998) stated producers simply wanted "a home for their milk. "
Under the Young Act, once a contract was established, a producer typically would not move to
another distributor because of the precarious position producers had relative to the distributor.
As stated by a Humboldt County (1998) producer, a variant of contract cancellation was contract
reduction.  In this case, the distributor would cut back on the amount of market (or total) milk
purchased from a particular producer.  If a producer lost his contract, another contract of equal
value (quantity and price) was difficult to find.  Banks were hesitant to grant loans to some dairy
producers because the source of their income could be canceled in 30 days.
Jerome Siebert (1998) University of California economist brought up a different reason
for a new policy.  Siebert stated that many contractual agreements included indirect and
unreported payments from producers to distributors.  The payments were a way for distributors
to recoup expenses made to buy market milk at the minimum price.  Producers and others have
argued that a common use of rebates was to prevent loss of contracts, especially in Southern
California.  During the 1960s, producers in Southern California were beginning to lose their
contracts to producers from the South San Joaquin Valley.7
Bob Horton (1998) and Glen Gleason (1998), both long-time employees of the California
Department of Food and Agriculture, noted that the movement of milk from the San Joaquin
Valley into the Los Angeles basin and the Bay Area was the result of changes in the cost of
production for the various regions.  Milk from the San Joaquin Valley flowed into the urban
areas when the Los Angeles basin and San Francisco Bay Area producers did not meet local
demand.  Therefore, some producers in the San Joaquin Valley had greater access to Class I milk
prices compared to their neighbors.  The overall outcome was a widened price spread among
producers.
The price distribution among producers was a cause of concern for many producers (see
figure 1). The histograms in figure 1 shows that the South Metropolitan (Los Angeles basin), the
San Francisco Bay Area, and the Sacramento Valley all had a higher share of producers with
high prices than North and South San Joaquin Valley areas (data were not available for Del
Norte-Humboldt).  The widening price spreads contributed to increasing producer
discontentment.
Producers from Humboldt County (1998) stated that the wide price spreads were
significant to them; during the 1950s and 1960s, they wanted "a fair share of the fluid [milk
market] in the state."  Close proximity to large populations usually signified large fluid milk
demand.  Therefore, distributors in the Los Angeles or San Francisco areas often had more Class
I milk contracts to grant than distributors in Humboldt or the San Joaquin Valley.
Economist Clarke (1967) named four problems: first, an increasing supply of Grade A
milk beyond the demand for Class I milk; second, widely different average blend prices; third, a
growing military consumption of milk at prices below the state regulated minimum price; and8
fourth, the producer-handler issue.  Siebert (1967) added discriminatory transportation rates as an
additional problem.
If marketing conditions were so bad, why did the policy last as long as it did?  The
longevity of the policy maybe traced to the diverse opinions occupying in the industry.
Improvements in production and transportation technologies, and population growth were the
basis of the differing opinions.  Problems in milk marketing developed slowly and were in part
the negative result of forces that allowed the industry to grow and prosper.
Solutions Sought
The problems with the Young Act rest on three points: market power, contracts, and state
regulated minimum price.  Under a regulated minimum price, market power of the distributors
generated opportunities to require a net price that was below the regulated minimum price.  The
minimum price, and expectation of continued Class 1 sales growth encouraged expansion of
Grade A milk beyond Class 1 demand.  The abundance of Grade A milk strengthened the ability
of distributors to extract rents, through the threat of contract cancellation.  The minimum price
law for market milk and the contracts created the problem of widely differing producer prices
because distributors could offer contracts with varying amounts of Class 1 milk.
Producers wanted to have more control over contractual agreements and higher net
prices.  Revenue pooling with a blend price would have resolved the problems of contractual
agreements because it would have removed the need for contracts.  Thus, a Federal Milk
Marketing Order (FMMO) was appealing to many producers.  However, producers felt that the
California Department of Agriculture would be more responsive to producers than the U. S.
Department of Agriculture. (Gleason, 1998)  Given how milk markets developed in California,
pooling would generate benefits for some producers but costs for other producers.  Producers9
with Class 1 contracts wanted to maintain their high prices so a single statewide (or even
possibly an area wide) blend price would not be acceptable.  The solution for removing contracts
would have to pool revenues, maintain high prices for traditional Class 1 producers, and allow
for more producers to be get higher prices through greater access to Class 1 sales.
Solution Found
A creative solution derived from the work of producer meetings and research from the
University of California prompted Assemblyman Joe Gonsalves to introduce Assembly Bill 910
March 6, 1967.  After receiving emergency status, the bill moved quickly through both houses.
Governor Ronald Reagan signed the Gonsalves Act into law July 7, 1967.  The Gonsalves Act
created a marketing policy that pooled milk revenues.  To reduce or eliminate losses for those
with Class 1 contracts, the state distributed quota in relation to Class 1 sales and base in relation
to historical production.
The policy worked as follows: The state pooled revenues, then disbursed the pool
revenue according to the quantity of quota, base, and overbase milk a producer owned.  Given
the total production of market milk, distributors purchased quantities of milk to satisfy demand
in each of the various use-classes of milk.  As regulated through minimum prices, Class 1 (fluid
milk and cream) was the highest value, then Class 2 (soft products), Class 3 (frozen products),
and Class 4 (butter, powder, and cheese). (Statues of California)
As pointed out earlier, a simple pool would never resolve the conflicts in the state.  The
pool with quota resolved two contentious issues: Producers with more Class 1 contracts would
maintain their price because the state gave all producers quota equal to 110 percent of their Class
1 contracts before 1967.  Producers with fewer Class 1 contracts would obtain a higher price
over time because the state gave new quota to eligible producers as Class 1 sales increased.10
Conclusion and the Recent Story
For the last thirty years, the legislature and regulators have amended the Gonsalves Act
and the associated regulations. While the law continues to function as a method to distribute pool
revenues, the perception of the quota has changed significantly.  A producer in Kings County
(1998) argued that the quota is now the equivalent of a stock certificate because quota generates
a monthly return, the premium of quota over the overbase milk price, and quota can be traded
with some restrictions (also see Sumner and Wilson).  Several producers have stated that quota is
a retirement plan.  Virtually no one views quota as an instrument to distribute pool revenue.
The Young Act lasted over three decades.  The Gonsalves Act has lasted another three
decades.  Both evolved and both withstood economic and political pressure.  We shall see how
much longer the Gonsalves Act is able to continue.11
Table 1. State Average Milk Prices
(in dollars per hundredweight of milk at 3.8% fat)
2
Market Milk Manufacturing Milk Difference
1950 4.36 3.19 1.16
1955 4.62 3.23 1.38
1960 4.77 3.23 1.55
1965 4.66 3.43 1.24
1967 4.97 4.04 0.93
Source: California Crop & Livestock Reporting Service, Manufactured Dairy Products, Milk
Production, Utilization, and Prices, various years.
Table 2. Difference between Cost of Production of Market and Manufacturing Milk
(in dollars per hundredweight of milk)
North Bay
3 North San Joaquin South San Joaquin
1955 1.27 0.64 0.64
1960 0.79 0.38 0.32
1965 -0.03 -0.03 0.11
1967 -0.02 -0.54 -0.36
Source: California Department of Agriculture, Milk Stabilization Branch, Standard Production
Cost Survey for Market and Manufacturing Milk, various years.  Each quarter the cost of
production is All Cost & Allowances less the Return on Investment and Return on Management.12
Figure 1. Share of Milk Producers Shipping Milk to Proprietary and Cooperative Fluid Milk
Plants, According to Blend Prices Received by Regions for September 1963
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